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NOTES
IS CERCLA WORKING? AN ANALYSIS OF
THE SETTLEMENT AND CONTRIBUTION
PROVISIONS
INTRODUCTION
Over a decade ago, in response to heightened awareness of
the public health threat posed by abandoned hazardous waste
sites, 1 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
1 See Patrick P. McCurdy, Every so Often Something Goes Wrong, CHEMICAL WK.,
Aug. 16, 1978, at 5 (recognizing high risk that chemicals pose to people and environ-
ment, and urging chemical industry to take remedial action). Perhaps the most infa-
mous pre-CERCLA hazardous waste site was "Love Canal," located in Niagara Falls,
N.Y. Id. Residents of a Niagara Falls community built on an abandoned hazardous
waste site suffered devastating health effects as a result of exposure to chemicals
which seeped through the ground. See Richard Roth, Long-Buried Poisons Ooze Out of
the Ground, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1978, at A2 (describing nightmarish site and effects
on residents). Letters from President Carter transmitting proposed cleanup legisla-
tion to Congress, as well as several committee reports, cited the Love Canal disaster.
H.R. Doc. No. 149, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1979) (letter from President Carter); S.
REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-12 (1980) (committee report); S. REP. No. 848,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 96, 104 (1980) (letters from President Carter); H.R. REP. No.
1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 (1980) (committee report). But see Michael P.
Dunne et al., The Health Effects of Chemical Waste in an Urban Community, 152
MED. J. AusTL. 592, 594 (1990) (reporting no greater incidence of cancer and other
serious diseases in people living near waste site when compared to control group).
This study did indicate that residents near the site suffered higher levels of stress and
anxiety than the general population, which can cause overall poor health. Id.; see also
HOLLY L. HowE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUmAN SRVS., PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT
CuIsmIcAus IN THm ENvIROmiENT: REGIONAL DIFFERENCES BASED oN-THREAT POTEN-
TIAL, 105 Pub. Health Rep. 186 (1990) (reporting results of study conducted in New
York State). Residents of three New York State regions were surveyed regarding their
perceptions of environmental problems. Id. at 186. The survey, completed by 4601
people, id. at 188, measured respondents' concerns regarding personal or familial ex-
posure to toxic environmental substances, environmental contamination caused by
pollution, specific health effects associated with toxic exposure, and economic conse-
quences flowing from hazardous environmental conditions. Id. at 187. Results of the
study indicate that although the threat posed by an environmental hazard may be
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sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 2 In 1986
minimal in a specific situation, the public may nonetheless perceive a grave danger.
Id. at 195. The author suggests that risk management should address both actual and
perceived concerns to encourage overall good health. Id. The Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, see infra note 2, created
the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry ("ATSDR"). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(i) (1988). The purpose of ATSDR is to "prevent or mitigate adverse human
health effects and diminished quality of life resulting from exposure to hazardous sub-
stances in the environment." Division of Health Studies, Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry, Hazardous Waste Sites: Priority Health Conditions and Re-
search Strategies, 267 JAMA 1180 (1992). ATSDR has identified seven categories of
human health diseases and disorders that may relate to environmental health risks.
Id. Further research is necessary to determine the exact relationship between the
diseases and environmental conditions and to develop diagnostic and treatment pro-
cedures. Id.
2 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified in various sections of titles 26
and 42 of the United States Code). The statute is also commonly known as
"Superfund." See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1 (1982). Members of Congress had been working on various toxic waste
cleanup bills for over three years before Superfund was finally passed. Id. at 1. The
law that was enacted was partly derived from three different bills: H.R. 7020, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); and S. 1480, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979). Id. at 2. A lame duck session of Congress considered and passed the
legislation after it was hurriedly assembled as a substitute bill. Id. at 19. Republicans
and Democrats joined together to prevent the failure of the environmental law; con-
cessions were made in both the House and Senate, and the law was quickly passed,
rife with purported inadequacies. Id. at 2, 19. Due to its origin, CERCLA's legislative
history is somewhat fragmented and does not lend itself well as an interpretative aid
to the complex statute. Id. at 2. At the time of CERCLA's enactment, other environ-
mental laws were already in existence, and CERCLA was intended in part to take up
where previous law, specifically the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. 1978), left off. Id.; U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDous WASTE, CoRRECTIvE ACTION CLEANUPS WILL TAKE
YEARS TO CoMPLETE 17 (1987) ("[Mlany RCRA facilities can be expected to ultimately
become Superfimd sites .... ."). CERCLA, coupled with RCRA, provides sufficient au-
thority "to begin the cleanup of old hazardous waste sites and to avoid the conse-
quences of new hazardous waste spills, for the protection of health and the environ-
ment." Grad, supra, at 2. RCRA is a comprehensive system that monitors hazardous
waste from "cradle to grave" by establishing mandatory standards for the identifica-
tion, tracking, and disposal of certain substances. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL.,
EvrmosmENTAL PROTECTION: LAw AND POLICY 558-63 (1984). CERCLA incorporates
by reference the definition of "hazardous substance" used in RCRA and three other
environmental statutes. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), 9602(a), (b); see also Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7412 (1982); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1982); Toxic Substances
Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1982). CERCLA was the first law to deal with
abandoned hazardous waste sites. Elizabeth Ann Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are
there any Defenses Left?, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 385, 387 (1988).
Most states have enacted environmental laws that are analogous to CERCLA and
other federal laws. See generally DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNEm A. MANASTER, STATE
ENvOimoaINTAL LAw §§ 6.05, 9.04 (1992) (providing overview of state law in shadow
of CERCLA). The effect of state law on a "potentially responsible party" ("PRP") will
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Congress amended CERCLA in what is collectively known as the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
("SARA"). 3 SARA added an important provision to CERCLA that
provides potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") with a right to
contribution from other liable parties. 4 SARA, however, also pro-
vides that this latter group will be protected from contribution
claims when it resolves its liability through settlements.5 The ap-
parent conflict between these different subsections of CERCLA
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Richard M. Hall, Survey of State Enforcement,
in ENrVo-mi NTAL LAw 531, 533-34 (1988). CERCLA's state/federal relationship is
somewhat like a partnership, id. at 538, the implications of which are beyond the
scope of this Note. Unlike many federal laws, CERCLA does not preempt state power.
Section 114 states: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or interpreted as pre-
empting any State from imposing any additional liability or requirements.. . ." 42
U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1988).
3 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675) (1988 &
Supp. 1992). President Reagan was strongly opposed to SARA because it imposed ex-
cise taxes on petroleum and feedstock chemicals. 4 WIwjma H. RODGERS, JR., ENVI-
RoNmENTAL LAw § 8.2, at 483-84, 499 (1992). Nevertheless, he signed it into law on
October 17, 1986, after the bill had passed both Houses of Congress by margins
greater than needed to override a veto. Id. at 484. Like CERCLA, SARA is a complex
piece of legislation. Its goals may be condensed into four general categories: (1) to
correct shortcomings of CERCLA, (2) to respond to court and agency decisions, (3) to
keep the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in check, and (4) to initiate stud-
ies and long-term measures. Id. at 485-86. Importantly, SARA also served to replen-
ish the Superfund. Id. at 499. CERCLA originally appropriated $1.6 billion to
Superfund. Jack Lewis, Superfund, RCA, and UST: The Clean-up Threesome; Love
Canal Legacy-Where Are We Now?, EPA J., July-Aug. 1991, at 8. In 1986, SARA
extended the program for five more years and authorized an additional $8.5 billion;
Superfund was again continued in 1990 with an additional $5.1 billion. Id. at 9. These
findings bring the cumulative authorization of Superfumd capital to $15.2 billion.
Superfund, Current Progress and Issues Needing Further Attention: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 193 (1992) (statement of Peter F. Guerrero, Assoc. Dir., Envtl. Protection Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic Dev. Div.). The repeated replenishment of
Superfund indicates that the cleanup of America's hazardous wastes is a more exten-
sive project than originally anticipated in 1980. RODGERS, supra, at 499.
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988); see also infra notes 21-32 and accompanying
text. Although the statute did not expressly provide for them, contribution claims had
been enforced under CERCLA before the 1986 amendments. See, e.g., United States v.
Ward, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1235 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (finding that Congress in-
tended federal common law to govern CERCLA liability); see also Elizabeth F. Mason,
Note, Contribution, Contribution Protection, and Nonsettlor Liability Under CER-
CLA Following Laskin's Lead, 19 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REy. 73, 92 (1991) (citing legis-
lative history supportive of contribution claims).
5 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988); see infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text; see
also 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(5), (h)(4) (1988) (settlement provisions). Congress had hoped
that the settlement provisions would help to quicken response actions, eliminate
needless litigation, promote voluntary cleanup, use resources more efficiently, and
treat parties more fairly. Mason, supra note 4, at 87.
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has resulted in unpredictable consequences for both settlors and
nonsettlors.6 Conflicting policy issues underlie the various statu-
tory provisions7 and have given rise to somewhat inconsistent ju-
dicial interpretations. Consequently, settlors often remain uncer-
tain about the finality of their CERCLA liability."
Part One of this Note examines the policy issues and congres-
sional intent underlying the CERCLA provisions relevant to set-
tlement and contribution. Part Two discusses recent court deci-
sions and synthesizes a majority rule on contribution claims.
Finally, Part Three considers whether SARA has accomplished
Congress' goals pertinent to settlements and whether changes
should be made to the statutory language when CERCLA is con-
sidered for reapproval this year.
I. THE STATUTE
A. Policy and Purpose
The impetus behind CERCLA was an interest in cleaning up
toxic waste sites.' The drafters intended the statute to be reme-
dial1 ° and, rather than burdening taxpayers, delegated cleanup
6 Compare, e.g., United States v. Hardage, 733 F. Supp. 1424 (W.D. Okla. 1989)
(interpreting PRPs' settlements in manner that preserves claims for recovery of re-
sponse costs by other liable parties), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., Advance Chem. Co. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 300
(1993) with Dravo Corp. v. Zuber, 804 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Neb. 1992) (finding response
cost claim indistinguishable from contribution claim, and therefore barred), affd, 13
F.3d 122 (8th Cir. 1994).
7 See infra notes 9-18 and accompanying text. Congress wants responsible parties
to pay the price of cleanup, but it also seeks to implement these cleanups quickly and
economically. Mason, supra note 4, at 87. Most sites, however, involve numerous par-
ties, and locating PRPs, determining liability and costs, and devising remedial meas-
ures is expensive and time-consuming. See infra notes 13-14. Thus, Congress' two
goals seem to be inherently in conflict.
8 See Rudolph F. Pierce & Daniel R. Avery, CERCLA's 'Contribution' Bar at Issue,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 20, 1993, at 23, 27 ("Judicial resolution of this issue will directly
affect the value of contribution protection to a party contemplating settlement with
the EPA."); see also Lynnette Boomgaarden & Charles Breer, Surveying the
Superfund Settlement Dilemma, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 83, 101-05 (1992) (discuss-
ing cases involving contribution claims against settlors).
9 COMM. ON ENV'T. AND PUB. WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABil-
ITy ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), PUB. L. 96-510, AT V (Comm. Print 1983) available in
WESTLAW, CERCLA-LH database ("[C]urrent events focused attention on the
cleanup of dumps containing toxic wastes, and this issue was the driving force that
ultimately brought forth the law.").
10 See 1991 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QuALITy ANN. REP. 111. CERCLA is not a regula-
tory law. Rather, its mission is responsive, mandating cleanup action at polluted
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costs to parties who produced and profited from the use of hazard-
ous substances.'1 As the time for CERCLA's reapproval drew
near, two principal criticisms began to emerge: cleanups were not
taking place quickly enough, 2 particularly as PRPs litigated
among themselves;'" and litigation costs were high,' 4 exhausting
finances that could be better directed toward cleanup efforts. The
strict, joint, and several liability structure of CERCLA' 5 had suc-
cessfully imposed the burden of locating recalcitrant parties on
sites. Id. "The 1980... Act... created a program to identify and clean up releases of
hazardous substances stemming from accidents or uncontrolled hazardous waste
sites." Id. (emphasis added).
11 Boomgaarden & Breer, supra note 8, at 84-85. The $1.6 billion "Superfund"
created by CERCLA to finance the cleanup of hazardous waste sites was derived from
taxes on the chemical industry. Glass, supra note 2, at 385; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631-
9633 (1988); see also RODGERS, supra note 3, at 499 (indicating that Superfund im-
posed $2.759 billion excise tax on petroleum, $1.365 billion excise tax on feedstock
chemicals, $0.51 billion tax on imported chemical derivatives, and obtained $1.25 bil-
lion from general revenues). SARA increased the fund to $8.5 billion. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9611 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); cf 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (tax code
provision relating to Superfund).
12 See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. S12,158, S12,160 (daily ed. 1985) (statement of Sen.
Riegle) ("The problem is huge, the cost is great, and progress to date in cleaning up
sites has been slow.").
13 See, e.g., Reauthorization of Superfund: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1241, 1298 (1985) (statement of William Bailey, on behalf of Ameri-
can Insurance Association). "[Plotentially responsible parties (PRPs) believe they can-
not acquiesce to liability under the current system, because to do so would subject
them to such potentially enormous costs for site cleanup ... that their very economic
survival would be threatened."). Id.
14 Id. at 1339-40. "This litigation is and will continue to be complex, time-con-
suming and incredibly expensive." Id. (statement of American Insurance Association).
15 132 CONG. REC. S14,895-02 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford).
"[Tihe current Superfund liability system.., imposes strict, joint and several liability
on those found responsible under sections 106 or 107 of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)." Id.
Although CERCLA, as enacted in 1980, did not explicitly impose joint and several
liability, case law developed that interpreted the statute as imposing such liability.
See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Colo-
rado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985). Congress confirmed this
interpretation in enacting the 1986 amendments, stating that:
The Committee fully subscribes to the reasoning of the court in the seminal
case of United States v. Chem-Dyne Corporation... which established a uni-
form federal rule allowing for joint and several liability in appropriate CER-
CLA cases .... The Committee believes that this uniform federal rule on
joint and several liability is correct and should be followed. It is unnecessary
and would be undesirable for Congress to modity [sic] this uniform rule.
Thus, nothing in this bill is intended to change the application of the uni-
form federal rule of joint and several liability enunciated by the Chem-Dyne
court.
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other PRPs instead of the government, 16 but had failed to en-
courage settlements. 17 By statute, the Superfund program was to
expire automatically in 1985.18 At that time, however, Congress
enacted SARA to address CERCLA's weaknesses. 19 One of
SARA's primary goals is to encourage settlements and thereby
funnel resources to site cleanups instead of litigation.20
Pursuant to this goal, Congress enacted sections 113(f)(1) to
(f)(3). Section 113(f)(1) expressly provides a right to contribu-
tion,2 ' codifying case law that interpreted the original CERCLA
provisions.22 Although CERCLA contained no express right to
H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CA.N.
2835, 2856 (citation omitted). Post-SARA courts have continued to follow the stan-
dard imposed by the Chem-Dyne court. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d
160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988) (indicating that CERCLA permits joint and several liability
in cases of indivisible harm), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989). But see Allied Corp. v.
Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1116 (N.D. IlM. 1988) (indicating
that court may reject joint and several liability when facts of particular case render
different apportionment of liability appropriate).
16 See 132 CONG. REc. S14,895-02 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Staf-
ford). "The theory underlying Superfimd's liability scheme was, and is, that the Gov-
ernment should obtain the full costs of cleanup from those it targets for enforcement,
and leave remaining costs to be recovered in private... actions...." Id.
17 See, e.g., Linda J. Wilson, Why Superfund Suits are Hard to Settle for Good,
CHEMICAL WK-, Dec. 9, 1987, at 8 (describing how EPA's approach to settlements dis-
courages many parties).
18 42 U.S.C. § 9633(c)(2)(D) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The statute, as passed, was
the result of a compromise of House and Senate bills which differed in breadth of
coverage and scope of liability. Grad, supra note 2, at 2. The compromise bill was
quickly drafted and passed during the closing moments of the 96th Congress. Id.
This hurried passage, surrounded by controversy, led to the provision that required
funding to expire in 1985. Glass, supra note 2, at 390.
19 See supra note 3; see also RODGERS, supra note 3, at 485 (describing SARA's
goals "to confirm, expand, and refine the cleanup aims of the 1980 CERCLA.").
20 See Mason, supra note 4, at 87.
21 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). Subsection 113(f)(1) reads:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any
civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this
title .... In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court deter-
mines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of
any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action
under section 9606 or section 9607 of this title.
Id.
22 See, e.g., United States v. Medley, 24 ERC 1856, 1858 (D.S.C. 1986) (concluding
that CERCLA provides right to contribution as matter of law); United States v. South
Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 995 n.8 (D.S.C. 1986) (noting
trend toward recognizing right to contribution), affd in part, vacated in part sub
nom., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
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contribution, the courts had inferred such a right, 3 reasoning
that CERCLA is not punitive in nature and that the right to con-
tribution is necessary to promote Congress' interests in achieving
U.S. 1106 (1989); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1492 (D. Colo. 1985)
("Congress did empower the federal courts to develop a federal common law of liability
under CERCLA § 107."); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,
229 (W.D. Mo. 1985) ("Congress did not intend to preclude actions under CERCLA for
contribution, but rather intended that the scope.., be determined as a matter of
federal common law. . . ."); Mola Dev. Corp. v. United States, 22 ERC 1443, 1446
(C.D. Cal. 1985) (analyzing CERCLA as parallel to Federal Water Pollution Control
Act which provided right to contribution); Webner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F.
Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985) ("CERCLA implicitly recognizes a right to contribu-
tion."). But see United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1265 (D. Del.
1986) ("But to say that section 107(e)(2) authorizes a right to contribution goes too
far.").
23 See Kristian E. Anderson, Note, The Right to Contribution for Response Costs
Under CERCLA, 60 NoTRE DAhm L. REv. 345 (1985). The issue of contribution under
CERCLA did not become important until the joint and several nature of CERCLA
liability was established by the federal courts. Id. at 355-56. If a party can be held
jointly and severally liable for an entire cleanup effort, the ability to seek contribution
from other PRPs becomes essential. See id. at 356. By 1983, courts had applied a joint
and several liability standard to CERCLA cases. See United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808-10 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (rejecting "blanket adoption" of joint
and several liability standard as "inconsistent with the legislative history of CER-
CLA," but implying that joint and several liability should be assessed on case-by-case
basis); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62-63 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (accepting Chem-Dyne rationale regarding joint and several liability under
CERCLA); see also Memorandum from Frank Shepherd, Assoc. Adm'r for Legal Coun-
sel and Enforcement, to Anne M. Gorsuch, EPA Adm'r (July 27, 1981), available in
LEXIS, Envirn Library, Agency File ("Congress did not intend to preclude courts from
imposing joint and several liability in all cases. Instead, Congress intended that stan-
dards of liability be determined on a case-by-case basis.").
In 1981, the Supreme Court decided that the right to contribution exists "through
the affirmative creation of a right of action by Congress, either expressly or by clear
implication ... or... through the power of federal courts to fashion a federal common
law of contribution." Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638
(1981) (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S.
77, 90-91 (1981)). Although the right of contribution was established, the courts re-
mained unclear about the federal common law that governed contribution claims
under CERCLA. Anderson, supra, at 358. The Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") argued that the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA")
should apply. Id. at 361-63. The UCATA prohibits contribution actions against set-
tlors. Id. at 362. It also, however, provides for pro rata apportionment of liability and
excludes contribution actions brought by parties who settle for less than full liability.
Id. Other courts have adopted the Uniform Comparative Fault Act ("UCFA"). See, e.g.,
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 402 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
modified, 681 F. Supp. 1394 (W.D. Mo. 1988). The UCFA reduces nonsettlors' liability
by the settlor's share of liability rather than the amount the settlor paid. See F. James
Handley, CERCLA Contribution Protection: How Much Protection?, 22 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,542, 10,544 (Aug. 1992). Under the UCFA, the government must
pay for any shortfall. Id.; see also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 836
F. Supp. 763, 769-71 (N.D. Okla. 1993) (describing both apportionment schemes).
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quick and efficient cleanups and protecting Superfund resources
from depletion.2 4 A right to contribution encourages responsible
parties to initiate cleanup measures because they may seek costs
from other PRPs.25 Cleanups should therefore take place more
quickly and efficiently.26 The joint and several liability structure
of the statute27 allows the government to hold a small number of
PRPs responsible for cleanup of an entire site,28 since a right to
contribution provides an incentive for the named parties to seek
out other PRPs.29 The subsequently larger pool of defendant
PRPs spreads the cleanup costs more fairly and increases the total
amount of private funds available.30 The parties responsible for
the wastes will absorb the cleanup expenses, thus utilizing private
resources rather than Superfund resources. 1
Section 113(f)(2) provides a contribution bar for settling par-
ties,3 2 extinguishing their liability for contribution. Section
24 See New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. at 1268-69. The court in New Castle
County stated that:
[A] right to contribution under CERCLA would enhance unique federal in-
terests in two substantial ways. First, the Federal Government is author-
ized by CERCLA to take action against responsible persons to achieve com-
pliance with the goals of the Act .... Because CERCLA liability is joint/
several, the Government needs to sue only a limited number of responsible
parties in order to recover all costs of cleanup and remedial operations ....
With a right to contribution available to CERCLA defendants, they will be
willing to undertake the burden to locate and implead other responsible per-
sons into a CERCLA action .... As the size of the defendant pool increases,
the chances for settlement of the suit and achievement of one of the federal
government's objectives under the Act-site cleanup at the expense of re-
sponsible parties-is met.
Second, a CERCLA right to contribution.., protects the Superfund's finan-
cial resources from depletion . . . since it encourages private parties to
cleanup hazardous sites for which they are responsible .... The use of pri-
vate funds to cleanup sites saves Superfund resources and enables those
moneys to be used to remedy conditions at other inactive hazardous sites
where responsible parties either cannot be identified or are judgment proof.
Id. (citations omitted).
25 See id. at 1269.
26 Id.
27 See supra note 15.
28 2 ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAw AND PROCEDURE § 10.1,
at 257 (1992).
29 See Anderson, supra note 23, at 356.
30 See supra note 24.
31 See supra note 24.
32 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988). Subsection 113(f)(2) states:
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for
claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such
1994] SETTLEMENT AND CONTRIBUTION PROVISIONS 501
113(f)(3) creates a disincentive for PRPs to reject settlement op-
portunities by authorizing enforcement or contribution actions
against nonsettling parties.3 3 Importantly, these provisions pre-
serve settlors' contribution rights and the government's right of
action against nonsettlors. 34 These changes in the statute have
been characterized as applying a "carrot and stick" approach to
settlements,35 alluding to Congress's recognition that parties will
not voluntarily settle unless they are somehow rewarded.3
B. How CERCLA Works
Once the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") locates a hazardous waste site, it conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine the way the site has been used, what
wastes are present, and whether the site poses a danger to the
public health.3 7 The most serious sites-determined by criteria
settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable persons un-
less its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others by
the amount of the settlement.
Id.
33 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3) (1988). Subsection 113(f)(3) states in part:
(A) If the United States or a State has obtained less than complete relief
from a person who has resolved its liability to the United States or the State
in an administrative or judicially approved settlement, the United States or
the State may bring an action against any person who has not so resolved its
liability.
(B) A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State for
some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in
an administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek contribution
from any person who is not party to a settlement referred to in [section
113(f)(2)].
Id.
34 Id.
35 E.g., TOPOL & SNow, supra note 28, § 7.15, at 174. The "carrot" is the protec-
tion gained if one settles, and the "stick" is that nonsettlors must make up the differ-
ence if the settlor settles for less than its proportionate share. See id.
36 See generally Mason, supra note 4, at 87-89, 104-07 (discussing settlements
and incentives they provide to PRPs). Congress intended that the contribution bar
and the right to sue nonsettling PRPs would encourage PRPs to enter into settle-
ments voluntarily. Id. These provisions were intended to allow settling PRPs to save
money and reach a degree of finality regarding their liability. Id. Without these incen-
tives, most PRPs would wait to be held responsible. Id. CERCLA's settlement process
is set forth in § 122 of SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988), which essentially adopted the
existing EPA settlement policy. See Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed.
Reg. 5034-01 (1985). Parties who have only a de minimis share of liability are specifi-
cally addressed and are encouraged to "cash out" of the hazardous waste site. See 42
U.S.C. § 9622(g).
37 William N. Hedeman et al., Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspec-
tive on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,413,
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such as amount and toxicity of wastes, number of people exposed,
and the actual or potential contamination of ground water-are
placed on the National Priorities List ("NPL"). 8  Once a site is
listed on the NPL, the EPA may either require responsible parties
to clean up the site39 or employ Superfund resources for cleanup 40
and seek cost recovery from PRPs.41
Regardless of which course of action the government chooses,
PRPs must eventually be located. In theory, all PRPs should be
10,415 (July 1991). The EPA identifies hazardous waste sites through several statu-
tory reporting requirements. RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC DEv. Div., U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: EXTENT OF NATION'S POTENTIAL HAZARD-
OUS WASTE PROBLEM STILL UNKNOWN 9 (1987) [hereinafter GAO REPORT I]. CERCLA
required all past or present owners and operators of facilities to notify the EPA by
June 1981 of any known, suspected, or likely releases of hazardous substances at the
owners' facilities. Id. As a result, 11,000 sites were reported. Id. A 1980 amendment to
the RCRA required states to establish identification and reporting programs and
states were offered federal grants to assist them in this effort. Id. From these and
other sources, the EPA formed a data base, originally known as the Emergency and
Remedial Response Information System (ERRIS), listing 9500 hazardous waste sites.
Id. In 1985, the EPA formed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Information System ("CERCLIS") by merging ERRIS and other
databases. Id. Once a site is entered into CERCLIS, it is evaluated through a series of
progressively detailed assessments to determine the kind of remedial action needed.
Id.
38 Hedeman et al., supra note 37, at 10,415; see Lewis, supra note 3, at 9. Sites
are numerically rated for inclusion on the NPL according to the Hazard Ranking Sys-
tem ("HRS"). TRAWis P. WAGNER, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE HAZARDOUS WASTE
REGULATIONS 299-301 (2d ed. 1991). The HRS assigns a numerical value to factors
that reflect the actual or potential danger of contamination to groundwater, surface
water, and air. Id. Any site that receives an HRS rating of 28.5 or higher, out of a
possible 100, may be placed on the NPL. Id. The top priority site in each state is also
placed on the NPL. Id. Additionally, if the Department of Health and Human Services
has issued a health advisory in connection with a particular site, it may be added to
the priority list. GAO REPORT I, supra note 37, at 9-10. The NPL, which periodically
appears in the Federal Register, is more like a guide than a directive, and the EPA
may also take action at sites not listed on the NPL. WAGNER, supra, at 300-01. Sites
which are listed, however, are certain and significant threats to the public health. Id
"CERCLA stipulates that the NPL contain at least 400 sites; as of July 1987, it con-
tained 802 sites, with an additional 149 proposed for inclusion. Historically, up until
1984, roughly 8 percent of CERCLIS sites were added to the NPL." GAO REPORT I,
supra note 37, at 10. By 1992, the NFL listed 1275 sites. RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND
ECONOMIC DEv. Div., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: EPA ACTION
COULD HAvE MINIMIZED PROGRAM MANAGEMENT COSTS 11 (1993).
39 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988). Parties subject to action under this section may be
liable to the government for fines or punitive damages. Id. §§ 9606(b)(1), 9607(c)(3)
(imposing fines up to $25,000 per day and treble damages).
40 See id. § 9604(a)(1) ("[T]he President is authorized to act, consistent with the
national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of... such hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant ...
41 Id. § 9607.
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located. In practice, however, this is extremely difficult to accom-
plish 42 and highly impractical because of CERCLA's expansive lia-
bility structure,43 in which hundreds of parties may be associated
with one site. As a result, PRP searches can be very costly, and it
is not unusual for the EPA to identify the minimum number of
parties to commence an action." Consequently, the burden of lo-
cating and suing absentee PRPs then shifts to those PRPs named
as parties by the EPA.4 5 This situation is precisely why the con-
tribution and settlement provisions in SARA are critical.
A Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study ("RI/FS")
must be conducted before cleanup can begin.46 The RI/FS involves
the examination of conditions at the site and the analysis of meth-
ods that may be used for cleanup.47 If the EPA decides to compel
the identified PRPs to carry out the cleanup,'4 it will oversee the
RIIFS conducted by the PRPs.49 If the site is to be cleaned using
Fund resources, 50 the EPA will conduct the study. It is common
42 See Hedeman et al., supra note 37, at 10,417. The EPA usually hires contrac-
tors and civil investigators to search for PRPs, which "entails significant costs for the
Agency." Id. Information from local offices, such as property tax records, may be used
to aid identification. WAGNER, supra note 38, at 324-25. Trash receptacles, drum la-
bels, abandoned vehicles, and license plates at the site are also used as leads in the
investigation. Id. The EPA has even taken out newspaper advertisements to find
PRPs. Hedeman et al., supra note 37, at 10,417.
43 Section 107(a) of CERCLA imposes liability upon: (1) the current owner or op-
erator of the site; (2) any owner or operator of the site at the time waste was disposed
there; (3) any person who arranged for disposal, storage, or treatment of wastes at the
site; and (4) any transporter who carried wastes to the site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)
(1988).
44 Hedeman et al., supra note 37, at 10,417.
45 Hedeman et al., supra note 37, at 10,417-19. The EPA encourages identified
PRPs to form organizations to facilitate the cleanup process. Committees represent
the group in negotiating settlement agreements and handling other matters, such as
technical issues regarding cleanup, allocating costs among PRPs, and locating other
liable parties. Id.
46 For a complete description of the RI/FS process, see WAGNER, supra note 38, at
302-12.
47 REsouRcEs, Co!nrINrTY, AND EcoNoMIc DEv. Div., U.S. GENEmU ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, SuPERuND: PROBLmS WITH THE Co~MiL.m NEss AND CONsISTEcY OF SITE
CLEANup PLANs 13 (1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT II]. The RI/FS is an in-depth site
study that assesses site contamination and estimates the risks posed to the surround-
ing community and environment. Id. "The feasibility study lists and evaluates alter-
natives for treating or containing the waste. On the basis of the site study, the pro-
posed plan selects and recommends a particular cleanup remedy. Public comment on
the plan is then solicited .... EPA and PRPs generally hire private contractors to
perform the actual study." Id.
48 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988); see also supra note 40.
49 GAO REPORT II, supra note 47, at 15.
50 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988); see also supra note 40.
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for identified PRPs to conduct a "shadow" RI/FS in this instance to
protect their own interests in defending future enforcement ac-
tions.5 1 After the RI/FS is completed, a preferred cleanup plan is
selected and documented in the Record of Decision ("ROD") which
is made available for public comment.52 The next two phases of
cleanup are the Remedial Design ("RD") and Remedial Action
("RA") phases. During the RD, the previously selected remedy is
refined, and a plan of implementation is designed." The actual
implmentation of the design takes place during the RA.5
Throughout the RI/FS process, and occasionally into the early
stages of remedial action, the EPA encourages PRPs to enter into
settlement agreements with the government.55 Settlement agree-
ments or consent decrees usually specify the settling PRP's reme-
dial obligations. 56 If the PRP is a "de minimis" contributor5 7 to
51 See Hedeman et al., supra note 37, at 10,419; see also David R. Hopper, Clean-
ing Up Contaminated Waste Sites, CHEMIcAL ENGINEERING, Sept. 4, 1989, at 99-100.
Many times, engineers actively involved with a process or facility know far
more about the types of materials used, manufacturing and waste-treatment
practices, and wastes produced at the site than the regulatory agency in-
volved in the site investigation. The engineer's active participation in the
regulatory process can ensure a less time-consuming and more cost-effective
study .... Such a focused approach ... ensures that sufficient data are
collected to characterize the real problems at a site.
Id.
52 GAO REPORT II, supra note 47, at 14-15. Generally, the Record of Decision
("ROD") serves two purposes: (1) it provides a detailed description of the remedy se-
lected and the various other measures considered, and (2) it documents decisions re-
garding whether wastes are to be treated or contained. Id. Other matters addressed
in the ROD include a description of current or potential threats to human health and
the environment, identification of key assumptions made during the RIIFS, and docu-
mentation of target cleanup goals. Id. For a detailed description of the Remedy Selec-
tion and Record of Decision process, see WAGNER, supra note 38, at 317-20.
53 VALERIE M. FOGELMAN, HAzARDous WASTE CLEANuP, LIABILITY, AND LITIGA-
TION § 3.16, at 43 (1992).
54 Id.
55 See WAGNER, supra note 38, at 324. The terms of a settlement between govern-
ment and a PRP are embodied in a consent decree, which specifies the PRP's remedial
obligations pursuant to the agreement. Id. Settlements may also be entered through
administrative orders which are not subject to judicial review. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 9622(h)(1) (1988) ("The head of any department or agency with authority to under-
take response action . . . may consider, compromise, and settle a claim under
9607 .... "). For a description of CERCLA settlement agreements, and the impact of
1986 amendments on them, see TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 28, § 7.15, at 147-73.
56 See WAGNER, supra note 38, at 324. When a settlement involves remedial ac-
tions, it must take the form of a consent decree. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A). This decree,
however, is not an acknowledgement of "an imminent and substantial endangerment
or liability," and it is inadmissible in judicial proceedings except as provided in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. WAGNER, supra note 38, at 324.
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the hazardous waste site, the EPA may negotiate a final settle-
ment of liability5" whereby the PRP simply makes a payment to
the Fund.5 9 In some cases, the EPA allows a "mixed funding" set-
tlement which requires both the PRP and the government to fund
portions of the cleanup.6" In any one of these settlement arrange-
57 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (1988) (addressing de minimis settlements). Although the
statute does not explicitly define which parties qualify as de minimis contributors, the
EPA provided guidance on this issue in 1987. De minimis parties are those who "con-
tributed hazardous substances in an amount and of such toxic or other hazardous
effects as to be minimal in comparison to other hazardous substances at the facility."
Superfund Program: De minimis Contributor Settlements, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,333,
24,334 (1987); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(A) (1988) (addressing minimal wastes).
Determination of de minimis contributors is site specific.
If, for example, all PRPs at the site disposed of waste of similar toxicity and
hazardous nature, e.g., organic solvents, then those PRPs who had contrib-
uted a minimal amount (in relation to the total amount at the facility) could
qualify for de minimis status because their waste was not more toxic or
otherwise hazardous than other hazardous substances at the site. If, on the
other hand, a PRP disposed of a minimal amount of a waste which is more
highly toxic or which exhibits other more serious hazardous effects than
other hazardous substances at the site, then that PRP, despite the minimal
amount of his contribution, normally would not qualify for treatment as a de
minimis party.
52 Fed. Reg. 24,333, 24,336.
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (1988) (addressing expedited final settlement); see
also 52 Fed. Reg. 24,333 (1987) (describing de minimis settlement process). Settle-
ment agreements between a PRP and the government ordinarily contain a "reopener"
provision that allows the government to sue a settlor at a later time "concerning fu-
ture liability resulting from the release or threatened release that is the subject of the
covenant where such liability arises out of conditions which are unknown at the time
the President certifies ... that remedial action has been completed at the facility
concerned." 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(A) (1988). In extraordinary situations the President
may exclude this exception if the language of the agreement will assure the protection
of the environment and public from future releases. Id. § 9622(f)(6)(B). De minimis
settlement agreements appear more attractive in terms of finality of liability because
they are not required to contain reopener provisions. Id. § 9622(f)(6)(A) (excepting de
minimis agreements under subsection (g)). De minimis settlors may become liable in
the future, however, if information reveals that they are no longer eligible for de
minimis status, or if costs exceed a specified amount. See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note
28, § 7.15, at 195.
59 52 Fed. Reg. 24,333 passim (1987); WAGNER, supra note 38, at 328. "The goal of
negotiations with de minimis parties is to achieve quick and standardized agreements
through the expenditure of minimal enforcement resources and transaction costs. To
attain this goal, the de minimis settlement [merely requires] a payment be made to
the fund." Id. In some circumstances, however, the EPA may enter into a de minimis
agreement that would require the settling party "to perform a discrete portion of the
response action needed for the site, such as performing an RIFS or cleanup of an
operable unit." Id.
60 See Hedeman et al., supra note 37, at 10,424. In the early days of CERCLA, the
government strove for 100% cost recovery in settlements with PRPs, and it would not
consider proposals for less than 80% of the cleanup costs. Frank B. Cross, Settlement
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ments, the right of contribution of either the government or of a
settling PRP is preserved against any PRP who is not a party to
the consent decree.61 Furthermore, a settling PRP is protected
from contribution claims "regarding matters addressed in the
settlement."62
II. CASE LAW
A. Cost Recovery Under Sections 107 and 113
Before Congress granted the explicit right of contribution by
adding section 113(f)(1), 63 courts had interpreted section 107(a)6
to contain an implied right of contribution.6 5 The courts reasoned
that when liability is joint and several,66 general principles of tort
law dictate that a right of contribution exists. Before 1986,
Under the 1986 Superfund Amendments, 66 OR. L. REV. 517, 530 (1987). Although the
EPA relaxed its standards in 1985, its policy "objective [was] still to recover one hun-
dred percent of the cleanup costs." Id. In the 1986 amendments, Congress expressly
provided for settlements that do not cover 100% of cleanup costs. Id. at 539. In fact,
the 1986 amendments provide "no floor on the percentage of cleanup costs for which
the EPA may settle." Id. Section 122(b)(1) authorizes the government to enter into
mixed funding settlements whereby a PRP can settle its liability by funding only a
portion of the cleanup at a site. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1) (1988). The government
funds the rest, and retains the burden of seeking cost recovery from recalcitrant
PRPs. See Hedeman et al., supra note 37, at 10,424. This arrangement is not used
frequently, however, because EPA officials do "not feel comfortable providing PRPs
with federal funds to clean up a site" which they created. Id.
61 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
62 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988); see supra note 32.
63 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988); see supra note 21.
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), (e) (1988). Section 107(a) is the section from which the
strict, joint, and several liability standard was derived. See supra note 15. Section
107(e)(2) states that "[nothing in this subchapter... shall bar a cause of action that
an owner or operator or any other person subject to liability under this section ... has
or would have, by reason of subrogation or otherwise against any person." Id.
§ 9607(e)(2).
65 Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1490-91 (D. Colo. 1985) (finding
right to contribution in § 107(e)(2)); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162, 214, 216 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (reasoning that correlative right to contribution
to joint and several liability standard exists and does not violate equal protection);
United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (following Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts view that damages should be apportioned when there is rea-
sonable basis to determine contribution of each cause of single harm); see United
States v. Ottati & Gross, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1395 (D.N.H. 1985) (stating that
right to contribution exists if parties are liable for divisible harm under § 107).
66 See supra note 15.
67 See, e.g., Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 224 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A states the general rule:
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PRPs always brought CERCLA cost recovery claims under section
107.68 Since the enactment of SARA, however, the issue has fre-
quently arisen whether section 113(f)(2), which bars contribution
claims against parties who have settled, also bars cost recovery
claims arising under section 107(a). 9 Some courts and commen-
tators argue that SARA divides cost recovery claims brought by
PRPs against settlors into two distinct categories: 70 (1) section 107
(1) Except as stated in subsections (2), (3) and (4), when two or more
persons become liable in tort to the same person for the same harm, there is
a right of contribution among them, even though judgment has not been re-
covered against all or any of them.
(2) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has
discharged the entire claim for the harm by paying more than his equitable
share of the common liability, and is limited to the amount paid by him in
excess of his share. No tortfeasor can be required to make contribution be-
yond his own equitable share of the liability.
(3) There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has
intentionally caused the harm.
(4) When one tortfeasor has the right of indemnity against another,
neither of them has a right of contribution against the other.
68 See supra note 65 (citing cases finding implied right to contribution).
69 See, e.g., United States v. ASARCO, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 956 (D. Colo. 1993)
("Under CERCLA's scheme, section 107 governs liability, while section 113(f) creates
a mechanism for apportioning that liability among responsible parties.") (citing
County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1517 (10th Cir. 1991)); Transtech In-
dus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1087 (D.N.J. 1992) (noting that
§ 107 is "inexorably linked with section 113" due to fact that original statute and
amendments must be read together as singular statutory response) appeal dismissed,
5 F.3d 51 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2692 (1994); Burlington N. R.R. v.
Time Oil Co., 738 F. Supp. 1339, 1341-43 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (discussing tension be-
tween § 107 and § 113); cf. Gregory John Walch, Note, Burlington Northern Railroad
v. Time Oil: Contribution Protection Under the 1986 Superfund Amendments, 22
ENvTL. L. 757 (1992) (discussing relationship between § 107 and § 113 addressed in
Burlington Northern line of cases).
70 See Transtech, 798 F. Supp. at 1085 (describing plaintiff's argument distin-
guishing between § 107 and § 113 claims); see generally Boomgaarden & Breer, supra
note 8, at 101-05 (discussing distinction between sections and reviewing cases in
which it was at issue). "[Nionsettlors will likely waste no time in testing the opportu-
nity presented by... Burlington Northern to pierce the veil of contribution protection
by characterizing their claims as seeking cost recovery rather than contribution." Id.
at 105.
Subsection 113(g) of CERCLA, which covers statutes of limitation, treats the two
causes of action separately. Actions for "recovery of the costs referred to in section
9607 ... must be commenced... within 3 years after completion of [a] removal action
... [and] within 6 years after initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial
action." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (1988). However, "[n]o actions for contribution ...
may be commenced more than 3 years after (A) the date of judgment.., or (B) the
date of an administrative order.. . " § 9613(g)(3).
Subsection 107(b) provides a list of specific defenses to liability under subsection
107(a). These defenses are limited to "(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; [or] (3) an
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claims covering cost recovery of privately initiated cleanups 71 and
(2) section 113 claims covering contribution claims of EPA-initi-
ated cleanups. 72 This approach, therefore, focuses on whether the
remedial action at a particular site was taken voluntarily.
In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Time Oil Co., 7 3 the
court recognized this distinction when it refused to bar a cost re-
covery claim brought by a voluntary PRP settlor against another
PRP settlor. 74 The two parties in Burlington Northern owned ad-
joining lots that were found to be contaminated with hazardous
material and consequently designated as a Superfind site by the
EPA in the early 1980s. 75 Prior to the commencement of any liti-
gation, the plaintiff entered into a consent decree with the govern-
ment and cleaned up its lot accordingly. 76 At that time, the de-
fendant did not enter into a settlement agreement and later failed
to comply with certain actions ordered by the EPA.77 As a result,
the EPA itself cleaned up the site and then commenced a civil suit
against the defendant to recover costs.78  It was not until 1988
that the defendant reluctantly settled with the government.79
[unforeseeable] act or omission of a third party.. . ." § 9607(b). It may be argued that
this list of defenses is exclusive, and therefore a § 107 claim is not affected by the
§ 113 contribution bar. See § 9607(b) ("[Dlamages resulting therefrom were caused
solely by [one of these three acts].") (emphasis added).
71 See Transtech, 798 F. Supp. at 1085 ("Plaintiffs... contend that since they
voluntarily began their clean-up operation, theirs is a cost recovery action under Sec-
tion 107."). These claims are termed "cost recovery" claims, and are distinguished
from "contribution" claims, in which a party seeks to share the liability imposed upon
it. Id.
72 Id. at 1085, 1087. These claims are arguably viewed as the only true contribu-
tion claims under CERCLA. "By its very language, Congress enunciated a strong de-
sire for settlements as the best means to effectuate the goals of CERCLA, concluding
that immunity from contribution liability would be the proverbial 'carrot' to coax the
parties into settling." Id. at 1087. The Transtech court believed that the plaintiff's
"argument... would drain the words 'voluntary' and 'contribution' of any meaning
whatsoever." Id. at 1087.
73 738 F. Supp. 1339 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
74 Id. at 1342-43.
75 Id. at 1340.
76 Id.
77 See id.
78 United States v. Time Oil Co., No. C86-990 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 1986).
79 See Lodging of Consent Decree Pursuant to Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act; State of Washington v. Time Oil Co., 53 Fed.
Reg. 33,558 (1988) ("The consent decree requires the defendant to pay $8.5 million to
be divided among the United States, the State of Washington, and the City of Tacoma,
in proportion to the costs that each has incurred and is anticipated to incur."); United
States v. Time Oil Co., Nos. C85-478TB and C86-990T, 1988 EPA Consent LEXIS 48
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 4, 1988) (consent decree).
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The court rejected the defendant's argument that its 1988 settle-
ment protected it from the plaintiff's claims for cost recovery
under CERCLA section 113(f)(2). ° Although the Burlington
Northern court could have denied the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment on simpler and sounder grounds,"' it chose to
acknowledge that two distinct causes of action exist under
CERCLA.8 2
The courts in two other cases, United States v. Hardage3 and
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States Air Force,4 similarly approved
80 738 F. Supp. at 1343; see supra note 32 (quoting text of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2)
(1988)).
81 738 F. Supp. at 1341. The court found that the plaintiff's claim was for relief
distinct from "matters addressed in the settlement" between defendant and the gov-
ernment, and thus was not subject to contribution protection under § 9613(f)(2). Id. at
1342; see 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988). The court also recognized that the plaintiff had
reached a settlement and incurred its costs before SARA was enacted. "There is no
evidence that [Burlington] could have anticipated the creation of § 9613(f, or that the
new section was intended to retroactively apply to litigation and settlements occur-
ring before 1986." 738 F. Supp. at 1342. The court might have reached the same
result by using either of these determinations alone, but nonetheless discussed other
issues. See id. at 1342-43; see also Boomgaarden & Breer, supra note 8, at 104-05
(discussing Burlington Northern); infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing phrase "matters addressed in settlement").
82 738 F. Supp. at 1342 ("The language of CERCLA includes.., distinctions be-
tveen contribution actions and cost recovery actions that lend weight to the interpre-
tation that Congress intended to maintain the separate avenues of recovery.").
Although the courtfs examination of the statute is arguably dicta, it poses a potential
weakness for settlors seeking protection from contribution. See Boomgaarden &
Breer, supra note 8, at 103-05.
83 750 F. Supp. 1460 (W.D. Okla. 1990), aff'd, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993). As a third party plaintiff, the Hardage Steering
Committee sought to recover response costs from de minimis parties who had settled
with the EPA. Id. at 1507; see Walch, supra note 69, at 775. The court found that the
agreement could not address private response costs incurred by other PRPs because
the government did not have the authority to settle these claims. Id. The court fur-
ther determined that the Steering Committee's § 107 claim was not barred by the
language of § 113. Id. at 775-76. The court agreed, stating that:
[A] response cost claim is an original claim to [recover] ... money that pri-
vate party defendants have spent for their own response measures .... A
contribution claim is a derivative claim in which a defendant attempts to
transfer to a third-party some of the liability asserted against it by the
plaintiff.
Id. at 776 (quoting United States v. Hardage, No. CIV-86-1401-P, slip op. at 70 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 22, 1989) (order granting partial summary judgment)).
84 766 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Wash. 1991), rev'd, 984 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1993), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994). In Key Tronic, the plaintiff entered into a
consent decree with the EPA. Id. at 867. Simultaneously, the EPA was treating other
parties, including the United States Air Force, as de minimis contributors, and en-
tered into a settlement agreement with them. Id. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the
Air Force and other parties for its costs incurred prior to the consent decree. Id. The
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the distinction between cost recovery actions under section 107
and contribution actions under section 113. Although each of
these courts acknowledged and approved the distinction, none of
them clearly explained what criteria should be examined to deter-
mine the character of a claim. 5 These decisions, therefore, pro-
vide little guidance regarding the potential liability and costs to
parties considering settlement.86 Such a lack of predictability, it
appears, begins to unravel Congress' desire to encourage parties
to enter into settlement agreements.
It is submitted that a much more logical and workable ap-
proach to interpreting SARA is to treat recovery claims and claims
for contribution alike. A recent court decision described the statu-
tory relationship: "[Wihen properly construed, the two sections
work together, one governing liability and the other governing
contribution from those found liable. First, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant has incurred section 107(a) liability.
Then, it can sue for contribution under section 113(f)(1)."8 7 This
court found that § 113 did not preclude the claims because Key Tronic sought recovery
of costs incurred "directly at [its] own initiative .... [rather than] indemnity from
settling PRPs for prospective liability to the United States .... " Key Tronic Corp. v.
United States, No. C-89-694-JLQ, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 1990).
85 Cf Walch, supra note 69, at 770-73 (analyzing Burlington Northern and Key
Tronic decisions).
86 See Walch, supra note 69, at 777-78.
It is difficult to glean the purpose of the courts' distinctions from the opin-
ions in [Burlington Northern], Hardage, and Key Tronic .... An "increased
measure of finality"... will not result if courts adopt the language and the-
ory proffered by the [Burlington Northern], Key Tronic, and Hardage courts
because it appears that a PRP incurring direct costs may circumvent the
effect of any settlement offering contribution protection.
Id.; see also Barry S. Neuman, No Way Out? The Plight of the Superfund Nonsettlor,
20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,295 (July 1990). "[A] court's approval of a consent
decree has been held to be a judicial act .... [A] court must independently satisfy
itself that the decree is fair, adequate, reasonable, in the public interest, and consis-
tent with the Constitution and the mandate of Congress." Id. at 10,297; see also
James A. Rogers & Miriam R. Nemetz, CERCLA Contribution Protection: When Do
CERCLA Settlements Bar Claims Against Settlors?, in HAzmous WASTES,
SUPERFUND, AND ToXIc SUBSTANCES 95, 103 (A.L.I. Oct. 28, 1993) ("Despite the broad
language employed by some of the decisions rebuffing response cost claims, their facts
may leave room for argument that response costs incurred truly independently of a
government enforcement action may give rise to viable claims under § 107, notwith-
standing later government settlements.").
87 Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1086 (D.N.J.
1992) (citing Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989)) appeal
dismissed, 5 F.3d 51 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2692 (1994). The Transtech
court acknowledged that if distinctions between § 107 and § 113 were accepted, the
plaintiff's position would not be improved because its actions were not voluntary;
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interpretation avoids undermining Congress' policy of encourag-
ing settlements and therefore expedites the cleanup process.
8 It
is submitted that Congress did not create a new cause of action by
adding section 113; rather, it confirmed one that had previously
been implied. 9 A majority of courts supports this rationale, 90 as
is reflected in recent decisions that reject the Burlington Northern
and Hardage reasonings. 91
rather, the measures were undertaken only after threats from the government. Id. at
1086-87; see County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1991).
"[We think [the plaintiff's] argument fails because it requires viewing this provision
in isolation. Instead, the contribution provisions of section 113 should be seen as part
of the larger statutory scheme .... [Slection 107(a) must be the source for any right to
contribution plaintiffs may have." Id.; see also Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 803
F. Supp. 1380, 1386 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (citing Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. EN-
SCO, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 384, 388-89 (C.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd, 969 F.2d 503 (7th Cir.
1992)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994). "The extent of a party's
liability under § 9613 comes into play after the party is found responsible under
§ 9607(a)." Id. at 1386 (emphasis added).
88 See HousE Cozni. ON ENERGY AND COMIERCE, SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS OF
1985, H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 80 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C-A.N. 2835, 2862. "In addition to encouraging settlement... section [113] will
help bring an increased measure of finality to settlements. Responsible parties who
have entered into a judicially approved good faith settlement under the Act will be
protected from paying any additional response costs to other responsible parties in a
contribution action." Id.
89 See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., Avnet, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (D.R.I.
1992) ("Thus, with Section 113, Congress did not add a new cause of action, but
showed that it was only affirming and making clear an existing cause of action for
contribution under Section 107."); Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 833 F.
Supp. 488, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that SARA was enacted to provide PRPs with
contribution rights and observing that "[u]nder § 9613(f) [of SARA], Plaintiff must
first prove Defendant is a responsible party under § 107(a)"); see also United States v.
ASARCO, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 956 (D. Colo. 1993) ("Under CERCLA's scheme, sec-
tion 107 governs liability, while section 113(f) creates a mechanism for apportioning
that liability among responsible parties.") (citations omitted).
91 See, e.g., Dravo Corp. v. Zuber, 804 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Neb. 1992), aff'd, 13 F.3d
1222 (8th Cir. 1994). In Dravo, Judge Kopf stated:
I am not inclined to follow Hardage .... Even if [the plaintiff] incurred
"independent response costs," [its] costs so expended reduced its liability to
the United States to the extent of the remedial utility of the response ....
Thus, because the response costs, no matter when or why they were in-
curred, will reduce [the plaintiff's] liability to the United States... a "re-
sponse cost claim" is indistinguishable from a claim for contribution ....
Still further, if the Hardage rational [sic] were adopted it would inject
into the ... settlement process a significant degree of uncertainty about the
exposure of the settling party to non-settling pariies ....
Id. at 1189 (citation omitted). The court in Dravo found that "the Hardage rational
[sic] frustrates, rather than furthers, the Congressional intent." Id.; see also United
States v. Colorado & E. R.R., 832 F. Supp. 304, 307 (D. Colo. 1993) ("The protection
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The statute's liability and recovery scheme clearly leaves non-
settlors at a disadvantage in that they may bear a disproportion-
ate share of liability.92 Nonsettlors often argue that this inequita-
ble construction of sections 107 and 113 is incorrect, 93 particularly
since CERCLA strives to spread the cost of site cleanup between
the responsible parties.94 The consequences, although unfair, are
subordinate to SARA's fundamental purpose of expediting the
cleanup process by encouraging responsible parties to undertake
remedial action.95 Under the amended version of CERCLA, PRPs
receive little benefit by not coming forward either to attempt a set-
tlement or otherwise. Nonsettlors' complaints are misdirected to-
ward the courts; they belong with the legislature.96
B. Circumstances in Which Settlors are Not Protected
Even if section 107 cost recovery actions are treated as contri-
bution claims, there are instances in which a settlor's immunity
against these actions may not be upheld.97
1. When Matters Are Not Addressed in the Settlement
Section 113(f)(2) provides as follows: "A person who has ...
[settled] ... shall not be liable for claims for contribution regard-
ing matters addressed in the settlement."9g Construction of the
agreement itself, therefore, is critical in determining whether a
specific contribution claim will be barred. In Akzo Coatings, Inc.
v. Aigner Corp.,99 the district court addressed this problem and set
contemplated by § 9613(f)(2) covers not just claims for contribution, but claims for
response costs that amount to nothing more than claims for contribution."). But see
Barton Solvents, Inc. v. Southwest Petro-Chem, Inc., No. CIV. A91-2382-GTV, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14337, at *14-*16 (D. Kan. Sept. 14, 1993) (finding distinction be-
tween contribution claim and cost recovery claim, but not deciding on bar due to set-
tlement of case).
92 See supra note 91.
93 See, e.g., United States v. Pretty Prods., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1488, 1503 (S.D.
Ohio 1991) (affirmative defenses 13 and 14). For an analysis of CERCLA liability ac-
tions from the nonsettlor's perspective, see Boomgaarden & Breer, supra note 8, at
107-11.
94 See supra note 24.
95 See supra note 3.
96 See Pretty Prods., 780 F. Supp. at 1495.
97 See Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1090
(D.N.J. 1992) (stating that settling parties are not protected from every possible claim
arising out of same site), appeal dismissed, 5 F.3d 51 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 2692 (1994).
98 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
99 803 F. Supp. 1380 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
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forth certain factors to be considered in determining whether a
claim involves "matters addressed in the settlement." These fac-
tors include "the particular hazardous substance at issue in the
settlement, the location of the site in question, the time frame cov-
ered by the settlement, and the cost of the cleanup."10 0 The Akzo
court examined each of these factors before finding that the contri-
bution claims brought against the settling defendants arose from
matters addressed in the settlement and, therefore, were
barred. 1 1 Despite a party's settlor status, it may have to pay
when sued for costs arising from matters outside the scope of its
settlement agreement. 10 2
2. When Parties Do Not Comply with the Consent Decree
Implicit in the contribution bar of section 113(f)(2) is the re-
quirement that the settlor actually comply with the terms of its
settlement agreement.10 3 If a party does not comply with the
terms of the decree, its protection from further liability may be
lost.10 4 However, since compliance with a consent decree may be
complicated and take years to effectuate, 10 5 the requirements set
forth in the agreement itself are crucial in determining the scope
of a settlor's contribution protection.
100 Id. at 1385 (quoting United States v. Union Gas Co., 743 F. Supp. 1144, 1154
(E.D. Pa. 1990)).
101 Id. at 1384.
102 E.g., United States v. Colorado & E. R.R., 832 F. Supp. 304 (D. Colo. 1993). In
Colorado & E. R.R., third-party defendants, who had entered into a consent decree
with the government, were denied a motion for summary judgment because there was
a genuine issue of material fact regarding costs covered under the settlement. Id. at
307.
103 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988).
104 E.g., Colorado & E. R.R., 832 F. Supp. at 307 (finding no contribution protec-
tion for party who has not paid $100,000 due under settlement); Dravo Corp. v. Zuber,
804 F. Supp. 1182, 1186 (indicating that failure to comply with consent decree termi-
nates contribution bar) affd, 13 F.3d 1222 (8th Cir. 1994).
105 Aside from de minimis settlements, where parties "cash out," see supra notes
55 and 56, a typical agreement sets forth with particularity the remedial action which
the settlor must undertake, as well as any finding which the settlor must provide.
WAGNER, supra note 38, at 324 (discussing settlements). Past costs for items such as
the RI/FS, see supra note 47 and accompanying text, or preliminary removal steps,
may be addressed in the settlement agreement as well. WAGNER, supra note 38, at
324. These documents are lengthy and quite complex. For illustrations of the complex
nature of consent decrees, see 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 226 (May 30, 1989) (consent
decree related to Love Canal, see supra note 1) and 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 194
(Feb. 28, 1989) (consent decree between Key Tronic Corp. and government, see supra
note 84).
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3. Claims for Indemnity
Indemnification agreements are addressed in section
107(e), 1°6 which states in part: "No indemnification, hold harm-
less, or similar agreement ... shall be effective to transfer...
liability imposed under this section. Nothing in this subsection
shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a
party to such agreement for any liability under this section." 10 7 At
first glance, these two sentences apparently contradict each other.
A careful reading of the plain language, however, reveals that
although parties may not escape their statutory liability, they
may transfer responsibility for costs arising from that liability.'0 8
106 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1), (2) (1988). The full text of these subsections provide:
(1) No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or convey-
ance shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel or
facility or from any person who may be liable for a release or threat of re-
lease under this section, to any other person the liability imposed under this
section. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to insure, hold
harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under this
section.
(2) Nothing in this subchapter, including the provisions of paragraph
(1) of this subsection, shall bar a cause of action that an owner or operator or
any other person subject to liability under this section, or a guarantor, has or
would have, by reason of subrogation or otherwise against any person.
Id.
107 Id. The 1986 amendments did not change this provision; it existed in CER-
CLA as enacted in 1980. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1980).
108 See Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1025-27 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (explaining contradictory language of § 107(e)). See generally Michael 0.
Ellis, Private Indemnity Agreements Under Section 107 of CERCLA, 22 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1953, 1954 (Dec. 6, 1991) (suggesting that Congress intended to prohibit avoid-
ance of statutory liability, rather than disallow private allocation of costs). But see
Joseph A. Sevack, Note, Passing the Big Bucks: Contractual Transfers of Liability
Between Potentially Responsible Parties Under CERCLA, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1571, 1575
(1991) (arguing for prohibition of contractual transfers of CERCLA liability).
An indemnification agreement between private parties differs from a private set-
tlement agreement between parties. See, e.g., Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical Waste Man-
agement, 690 F. Supp. 1409, 1416-17 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (rejecting indemnification argu-
ment but barring contribution claim because of terms of private settlement
agreement). Most courts will approve contribution bars in private settlements of CER-
CLA under either § 113(f)(2) or general contribution principles. Rogers & Nemetz,
supra note 86, at 115; see also Denver v. Adolph Coors Co., 829 F. Supp. 340, 344 (D.
Colo. 1993) ("[A]lthough section 113(f)(2) does not itself provide authority for private-
party contribution bars, such bars are clearly in keeping with the spirit of both facili-
tating settlement as well as CERCLA."). Courts will, however, usually apply the Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act ("UCFA") approach to these contribution actions rather
than the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA") approach, which is
applied in cases in which the PRP-settlor entered into an agreement with the govern-
ment. Rogers & Nemetz, supra note 86, at 116; see supra note 23 (noting differences in
UCFA and UCATA apportionment schemes).
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A strong majority of courts has interpreted the provision in this
manner. 
0 9
Settling parties who have expressly agreed to indemnify other
PRPs may try to escape their contractual liability by raising the
contribution bar of section 113.110 The few courts that have di-
rectly addressed this argument, however, have rejected it, indicat-
ing that settlors should not be released from their indemnity
agreements."' Such a conclusion, based on a review of CERCLA's
109 Armotek Indus., Inc. v. Freedman, 790 F. Supp. 383, 386-87 (D. Conn. 1992);
C.P.C. Intl v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1283 (W.D. Mich. 1991); Niecko
v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 988 (E.D. Mich. 1991), aff'd, 973 F.2d 1296 (6th
Cir. 1992); Channel Masters Satellite Sys., Inc. v. JFD Elecs. Corp., 702 F. Supp.
1229, 1231 (E.D.N.C. 1988); Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994,
1000 (D.N.J. 1988); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp. 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1571
(E.D. Pa. 1988); see also Lisl E. Miller, Comment, Indemnification Agreements Under
CERCLA, 23 ENvrL. L. 333, 333 n.5 (1993) ("[R]elease agreements may bar CERCLA
claims even if the agreements predate the statute.") (quoting United States v. Mon-
santo Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989)); Ellis,
supra note 108, at 1957 n.3 (citing cases that upheld private hold harmless agree-
ments between PRPs).
A minority view has emerged in the Sixth Circuit, declining to uphold indemnifi-
cation agreements between PRPs. In AM Int'l Inc. v. International Forging Equip.,
743 F. Supp. 525, 529-30 (N.D. Ohio 1990), the court found that a contractual indem-
nification agreement was not enforceable because both parties were PRPs at the site.
Later, in CPC Intl., Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1282-83 (W.D.
Mich. 1991), the court agreed with AM Intl's reasoning, stating: "This outcome is
consistent with the statute's broad policies of encouraging cleanups and placing the
burden of their costs on those responsible for hazardous waste problems. In addition,.
.. this result is consistent with the legislative history of section 107(e)(1)." Id.; see also
Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (fol-
lowing Ninth Circuit precedent but approving Sixth Circuit's reasoning), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1992). These courts seem to misinterpret the
language and legislative history of the provision. Ellis, supra note 108, at 1954.
110 Daniel R. Avery, Enforcing Environmental Indemnification Against a Settling
Party Under CERCLA, 23 SEToN HAL L. REv. 872, 875 (1993). Enforcement of an
indemnification agreement is difficult. A court "will cast a very leery and critical eye
towards any contractual language that purports to allocate environmental cleanup
responsibility." Id.
111 Id. at 892 n.81; see also United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79,
91-92 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Although such immunity [via indemnification] creates a palpa-
ble risk of disproportionate liability .... [it] promotes early settlement and deters
litigation."); United States v. Pretty Prods., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1488, 1496 (S.D. Ohio
1991) ("[Tlhe parties... should have negotiated mutually acceptable indemnification
provisions and included them in their contracts."); Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Indus-
trial Oil Tank & Line Cleaning Serv., 730 F. Supp. 1498, 1507 (W.D. Mo. 1990) ("CER-
CLA ... permits enforcement of an indemnity agreement."). These courts prohibited
claims for equitable indemnity against settling parties, indicating a different result
for contractual indemnification. See infra note 116 (discussing equitable
indemnification).
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legislative history112 and public policy considerations, 1 3 suggests
that contractual indemnity does not fall within the meaning of
"contribution" as set forth in section 113.114 Rather, public policy
strongly favors freedom of contract with which courts are reluc-
tant to interfere. 11 5 It should be noted that, in this context, courts
distinguish contractual indemnification from indemnification
based on equitable grounds.11 6 Much disfavor is cast upon at-
tempts to shape a barred contribution claim into an equitable in-
demnification claim.11 7
C. General Rule
A PRP who enters into a CERCLA settlement with the gov-
ernment should consider the language of the agreement carefully.
The PRP will only receive protection from future claims regarding
those matters addressed in the settlement. 1 , Contribution, cost
recovery, and equitable indemnity claims are generally barred as
long as the settlor does not default on the agreement.11 9 The lan-
guage of the agreement should reflect factors such as the nature of
the contamination at the site, the time period involved, locations
within the site boundaries, and potential costs involved. Parties
112 Avery, supra note 110, at 891-92.
113 Ellis, supra note 108, at 1957. The freedom to contract is deeply rooted in
American jurisprudence. Id. Rights to indemnification between PRPs are most likely
bargained for and received in exchange for consideration. Id. Consequently, if courts
do not give effect to these contracts, settlors would be unjustly enriched. See Miller,
supra note 107, at 348-49.
114 Avery, supra note 110, at 894.
115 See supra note 111. But see Pretty Prods., 780 F. Supp. at 1496 n.7 ("Even if
[the] claim for indemnification was based on a contractual provision, this Court would
be skeptical of any attempt to make an end run around CERCLA's contribution
immunity.").
116 See, e.g., Allied Corp. v. Frola, No. CIV. A87-462, 1993 WL 388970, at *10
(D.N.J. Sept. 21, 1993). Equitable indemnity arises when there is a special relation-
ship between two parties such that one should be liable rather than the other. Id.
Relationships such as principal-agent, bailor-bailee, lessor-lessee, union-union mem-
ber, and employer-employee support a finding of equitable indemnity. Id. Equitable
indemnification claims against CERCLA settlors will, however, probably be barred,
since the nonsettlor's "indemnity claim is merely a disguised claim for contribution."
Id. at *11. "[A] noncontractual indemnity claim, by definition and extrapolation, 'is in
effect only a more extreme form [of a claim for] contribution.'" Pretty Prods., 780 F.
Supp. at 1496 (citations omitted).
117 See, e.g., Pretty Prods., 780 F. Supp. at 1496 n.7.
118 See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
119 See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
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may contractually shift the financial burden of site cleanup,
notwithstanding any settlements with the government.
120
III. Is THE STATUTE WORKING?
A. Criticism
Criticism of CERCLA is widespread. President Clinton suc-
cinctly expressed this critical sentiment when he stated: 'We all
know it doesn't work. Superfund has been a disaster."12 1 Mem-
bers of both the public and private sectors have echoed this de-
spondent view.' 22 These detractors typically point to three basic
flaws of CERCLA: (1) cleanups are rarely completed, (2) litigation
and other transaction costs are too high, and (3) the strict, joint,
and several liability standard is unfair.12 3 These concerns sound
disturbingly similar to those that SARA was intended to cor-
rect.' 2 4 It is likely, therefore, as reauthorization for Superfund
120 See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
121 See Ted Williams, The Sabotage of Superfund: The Federal Program Has Cost
Billions, Cleaned Up Little, and Satisfied No One, 95 AUDUBON 30, 31 (July-Aug.
1993) (quoting President in reference to 1994 reauthorization hearings); see also
Keith Schneider, New View Calls Environmental Policy Misguided, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
21, 1993, § 1, at 1. As governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton criticized the progress at a
dumpsite in his state after officials spent millions of dollars to accomplish little more
than to create numerous technical documents and legal bills. Id. at 30.
122 Administration Dedicated to Reform of Law, EPA Deputy Administrator Tells
NACEPT Panel, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Nov. 9, 1993. Carol Browner, the EPA ad-
ministrator, has commented that Superfimd "needs not just cosmetic changes, but a
fundamental change." Id. at A9; see Williams, supra note 121, at 31 ("No one remotely
connected with Superfund is happy about the way it has functioned."); Charles de
Sallan, In Praise of Superfund, 35 ENV'T 42, 42 (Oct. 1993) ("[Mluch of the criticism of
Superfund has originated from large industrial corporations and their insurance
carriers.").
123 See generally Williams, supra note 121, at 30-37; Hedeman et al., supra note
37, at 10,415-23 (describing in detail the many transaction costs incurred in CERCLA
claim).
[O]nly 163 of 1,204 sites have been remediated, and in many cases polluters
have been granted what the EPA calls the "containment" option-a feline
approach to toxic-waste management in which they just cover their messes
and walk away. The average cleanup has cost about $25 million and taken 7
to 10 years to complete .... Polluters identified by the EPA have been madly
rummaging through dumps, trying to identify other polluters by their trash
and so spread liability. In the process small towns, businesses, and individ-
uals that contributed legally and insignificantly to landfills have been intim-
idated and assessed for cleanup costs in a fashion utterly inconsistent with
the intent of Congress .... The insurance companies are warring in court
with industries to whom they have rashly sold pollution-liability policies.
Williams, supra note 121, at 31.
124 See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
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legislation approaches, that legislators will consider whether the
statute has demonstrated any improvement over the past seven
years. Specifically, it must be determined whether the settlement
and contribution provisions enacted in 1986 have helped further
Congress' purposes and intent. Perhaps it is time to restructure
the basic CERCLA program to foster greater efficiency in cost and
cleanup. It is submitted, however, that such a restructuring of the
statute will not correct CERCLA's faults; rather, CERCLA's goals
can only be accomplished through an improved enforcement
program.
1. Why Are the Sites Not Being Cleaned?
A glance at the statistics seems to indicate that Superfund is
simply not effectuating cleanup. Only forty sites have been de-
leted from the NPL, which currently lists 1275 other sites, during
Superfund's lifetime. 125  It may, however, prove meaningful to
look beyond the numbers. For instance, a site is deleted from the
NPL only after cleanup is completed such that no further threat of
release exists.-26  Cleanup itself takes six to eight years, at
125 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: CLEANuPs NEAmNG COM-
PLETION INDICATE FUTuRE CHALLENGES 2-3 (1993) [hereinafter GAO REPORT III] (Re-
port to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Superfund, Recycling, and Solid Waste Man-
agement, Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate). In 1991 the
EPA created a new "construction-complete" category, responding to criticism that
cleanup at NPL sites was taking place too slowly. Id. This category includes sites
where construction of cleanup remedies is complete, but further long-term efforts,
such as groundwater treatment, are required before the site will be removed from the
NPL. Id. The EPA believed that progress at the waste sites had been underreported
before this category was created. Id. at 18. The Agency's goal was to have 130 sites
either placed in the construction-complete category or removed from the NPL by the
end of fiscal year 1992. Id. The goal was met, with remedy construction completed at
109 sites and 40 sites deleted from the NPL by September 30, 1992. Id.; see also State-
ment of EPA Administrator Browner on Reauthorization of Federal Superfund Pro-
gram, (May 12, 1993), reprinted in 7 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1510, (May 19, 1993) [here-
inafter Browner Statement]. Historically, sites have been added to the NPL at a rate
of 100 sites per year and experts expect this rate to continue over the next several
years. Lewis, supra note 3, at 9. In addition, over 30,000 other sites are slated for
Agency investigation. See Blake Early, Debate on Superfund Reauthorization Contin-
ues, Don't Overlook the Progress Under Superfund, 15 NATION's CITIEs WELY. 5 (Oct.
5, 1992).
126 See GAO REPORT III, supra note 125, at 17.
Before EPA deletes a Superfund site from the NPL, all work at the site must
be completed and all threats to human health and the environment must be
controlled. The state must also concur with the decision to delete the site
from the NPL. When EPA determines that all appropriate work is com-
pleted, including implementing any restrictions on future land use at the
site and a plan for site maintenance, the agency may place a notice of intent
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best.127 It is logical, therefore, to conclude that cleanup projects
begun during the early years of the Superfund program are only
now reaching completion. Moreover, most NPL-listed sites have
been stabilized, and cleanup is underway, lessening the threat to
the public health.12  It is submitted that two major factors have
slowed site cleanup: technological limitations and inordinately
high standards of "clean."
Before CERCLA was enacted, environmental cleanup technol-
ogy simply did not exist.129 The unique nature and complexity of
each Superfund project led to time-consuming and expensive re-
medial plans. 30 As PRPs were faced with enormous cleanup
projects and huge costs, they were compelled to develop new and
more efficient cleanup technology.' 3 ' As a result, environmental
to delete the site from the NPL in the Federal Register. The public has 30
days to comment on the proposed deletion, and EPA must respond to any
comments. The site may not be deleted unless state agencies concur that the
site protects human health and the environment, and the state or responsi-
ble parties agree to maintain the site.
Id.; see also Lewis, supra note 3, at 9.
127 Lewis, supra note 3, at 10. Sites on the NPL pose many challenges; they are
on the list precisely because they are the worst hazards. Cleanup is complex and in-
volves consideration of a site's physical characteristics (hydrology, geology, and topog-
raphy), type (landfill, manufacturing plant, or metal mine), and chemical characteris-
tics. Id. Some cleanups take considerably longer than others. Consider, for example,
the McCall Waste Site in Fullerton, California. Aviation fuel dumped at this site dur-
ing World War J- has seeped up to the ground's surface as a sludge containing toxins
such as sulfur dioxide and benzene. The site has been listed on the NPL for more than
ten years, and it has not yet been properly cleaned. Transcript # 464-1 (CNN news
broadcast, Nov. 26, 1993). The average time to complete a RI/FS, before a site is even
listed on the NPL, is eight years. William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Superfund Trivia Test: A
Comment on the Complexity of the Environmental Laws, 22 ENVTL. L. 417, 421 (1992).
128 See de Saillan, supra note 122, at 43. In 1991, Superfimd had "treated, iso-
lated, neutralized, or removed from the environment 13 million cubic yards of contam-
inated soil and solid wastes, a billion gallons of liquid waste, 6 billion gallons of con-
taminated groundwater, and 316 million gallons of polluted surface water." 1991
COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QuALrrY ANN. REP. 111; see also Browner Statement, supra note
125.
129 See Lewis, supra note 3 at 8, 10.
130 See Rodgers, supra note 127, at 421-22.
131 Industries are developing innovative ways to put old technology to new uses.
In the case of United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 79 (1st Cir. 1990),
for example, which began in the 1980s, the EPA wanted a group of PRPs to build an
incinerator to remove wastes. The companies devised a more economical cleanup plan
that involved vacuum extraction, a technology usually used in construction. See Far-
Sighted View of the Environment, 16 NAT. L.J., Nov. 8, 1993, at S4 (profiling attorney
representing group of PRPs in Cannons). As a result, tens of millions of dollars were
saved. Id.
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cleanup has become an industry in itself.13 2 It is submitted that
CERCLA's strict, joint, and several liability standard has
spawned positive advances in technology and has forced compa-
nies to handle hazardous materials more responsibly.133 Ameri-
can companies have found that it is worthwhile to invest in a
clean operation today to avoid being subject to a Superfund claim
tomorrow.
Much debate has centered on the question of "how clean is
clean"?134 Some commentators believe that valuable resources are
being used to pursue unnecessary remedial goals after all realistic
risks have been eliminated. 135 For example, one site located in
Mississippi is in the final stages of a $20 million cleanup pro-
ject.136 Although the land is located in an industrial area-it has
been home to a lumber mill, a turpentine plant, and a chemical
manufacturer-the EPA insists that the site meet standards that
would render it suitable for any purpose, including residential
132 See Industry Leaders Tell Clinton Officials What Policies Would Promote
Technology, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA) (Nov. 9, 1993). The United States has
emerged as a world leader in environmental technology, in large part due to CER-
CLA's harsh liability standard. See id. American companies are presently attempting
to enter the global market for environmental controls, with positive effects expected
for the American economy. Id.
133 See Williams, supra note 121, at 37. Peter Berle, president of the National
Audubon Society and former commissioner of the New York Department of Environ-
mental Conservation, has said,
Joint and several liability has put the fear of God into everybody, which
means they are careful in ways they never were before in what they do with
their waste. I also think the cost risk of inappropriate toxic-waste disposal
has been the major impetus toward waste minimization. When it gets too
expensive to deal with it, then you make less.
Id.
134 E.g., Browner Statement, supra note 125; see also Matt Roush, How Clean is
Clean? Contaminated Land is Barrier to Redevelopment, 9 CRAn"s DET. Bus. 14 (Jan.
4, 1993) (observing that high standard of "clean" discourages land redevelopment); see
also Superfund Easing Standards Can Result in a Cleaner Nation, DET. FREE PREss,
Feb. 7, 1994, at 6A ("[A] consensus is building that the EPA's back-to-Eden standards
are too rigid, too costly and more likely to produce lawsuits than improvements in
health."); Superfund: Cleanups Nearing Completion, Future Challenges, and Possible
Cleanup Approaches, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Superfund, Recycling, and
Solid Waste Management of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (Sept. 9, 1993) (statement of Peter F. Guerrero, Associate
Director, Environmental Protection Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic
Dev. Div.) ("[O]pinions range from the belief that all sites should be completely cle-
aned to pristine conditions to the belief that cleanup decisions should be made on a
site-by-site basis.").
135 E.g., Browner Statement, supra note 125 (acknowledging various criticisms of
CERCLA).
136 See Schneider, supra note 121, at 30.
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use.137 Consideration for residential use includes the possibility
that children might play in the area some day. According to EPA
guidelines, this site will not be removed from the NPL until the
soil meets standards that would allow a child to consume one-half
of a teaspoon of dirt every month for seventy years without having
an increased risk of cancer.
138
2. Why Are Costs So High?
It is indisputable that the costs to PRPs involved in a CER-
CLA claim are enormous.13 9 Many blame these costs on the law's
imposition of strict, joint, and several liability. 40 This liability
137 Schneider, supra note 121, at 30.
138 Schneider, supra note 121, at 30. Recent legislative proposals address this
seemingly bizarre situation. See Tom Kenworthy, Overhaul is Proposed for Law Gov-
erning Cleanups of Hazardous Waste Sites, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1994, at A17 (high-
lighting proposed revisions in Superfund). "[A] far-reaching change contained in the
proposal would permit different approved levels of restoration for hazardous waste
sites based on their probable future use. For example, a site in an industrial area
would no longer be required to be cleaned sufficiently to make it safe for a day care
center or residential housing." Id.
The 1986 Amendments directed the EPA to use existing federal or state environ-
mental standards or criteria to determine the necessary level of "clean" at Superfund
sites. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAzARDous WAsTE: CoaaRcrIE ACTION
CLEANUPS WLL TAKE YEARs To Com'PL= 32 (1987). The EPA collectively refers to
these possible cleanup standards as Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Require-
ments ("ARARs"). Id. The three most common types of ARARs are subclassified as: (1)
Maximum Contaminant Levels ("MCLs"), (2) state environmental standards, and (3)
federal water quality criteria. Id. at 33. Some sites may contain hazardous chemicals
which do not easily fit into any of the ARARs. Id. The EPA, realizing this, has devel-
oped additional guidance and criteria, resulting in a broad array of cleanup stan-
dards. See id. at 33-34. Selection of the appropriate standard depends upon site-spe-
cific factors, including: (1) the use and potential use of water at the site, (2) the
presence of groundwater or surface water, (3) the particular chemicals found at the
site, and (4) the state standards applicable at that location. Id. at 34. CERCLA con-
tains a rarely used "fund-balancing" provision which provides that"if EPA determines
that the cost of attaining an ARAR for a particular site would be too high and dilute
the Superfund moneys available for other cleanup efforts, EPA could require a less
stringent, though still protective, level of cleanup." Id.
139 See Rodgers, supra note 127, at 421-22. An average CERCLA cleanup costs
$24 million; some sites have cost as much as $50 billion. Id. at 422. There are cases in
which the R/FS alone costs nearly $10 million. Id. at 421-22. See generally Hedeman
et al., supra note 37, at 10,419 (estimating average cost of RI/FS to be $1.3 million).
140 See Hedeman et al., supra note 37, at 10,414. The EPA has attempted to util-
ize alternative mechanisms to ease the burden placed on PRPs, but these methods do
not alter the underlying theory of liability. Id. As a result, transaction costs gener-
ally remain high. Id.; see also Casey Bukro, EPA Out to Clean Up "Ridiculous' Situa-
tion; Superfund's Record of Mismanagement and Waste Targeted, Cm. TifB., Apr. 11,
1994, (Business), at 1. "Yes, the costs of cleanup need to be shared, but this is ridicu-
lous. Small business owners are coming in and telling us they've been driven almost
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standard brings along with it the right to contribution as well as
the settlement provisions. A pertinent issue is whether Congress
should do away with these provisions or otherwise improve the
enforcement program to minimize costs.
A recent study by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice con-
cluded that between 1986 and 1989 insurers spent an average of
eighty-eight percent of their Superfund-related outlays on litiga-
tion and other transactional costs. 141 During the same time pe-
riod, however, industrial companies spent twenty-one percent,
and the government eleven percent, of their respective outlays on
the same costs. 142 These numbers probably reflect the willingness
of insurance companies to aggressively litigate their policyholders'
CERCLA-related claims. 143  Insurance companies somewhat
to bankruptcy by the legal costs associated with Superfimd." Id. (quoting Carol
Browner, EPA Administrator). Joint and several liability allows the EPA to burden
one or two PRPs with the task of bringing the numerous other liable parties into
court. Id. One Chicago lawyer has characterized the liability rules as "grotesquely
unfair," accusing the EPA of suing "'politically acceptable' targets, such as Fortune
500 companies with deep pockets.... 'So the agency typically leaves the dirty work to
responsible parties' to go aier the small fry." Id. (quoting environmental attorney
Russ Selman).
141 See de Saillan, supra note 122, at 43 (citing RAND study and commenting on
its analysis).
142 de Saillan, supra note 122, at 43.
143 See Bruce F. Freed, The Politics of Pollution Liability, 89 BESrs Ra-. 38, 40
(Property-Casualty Insurance ed., Mar. 1989) (noting that numerous manufacturing
companies have sued insurance carriers seeking pollution coverage under old poli-
cies). Insurance companies take the position that they should not bear the costs of
hazardous waste site cleanups.
There are ... three strong arguments why passing pollution cleanup
costs to insurers does not serve the public's best interests ....
First, there is the harsh reality that even bleeding the property/casualty
industry white would not provide enough money to pay for toxic waste
cleanup. Even the drastic step of spending the industry's entire surplus...
would be insufficient to cover more than a fraction of the total cleanup costs.
And the insurance business would grind to a halt in the process.
Second, passing cleanup costs through to insurers violates the doctrine
of making the polluter pay. Where is the financial disincentive to pollution
when a manufacturer can cut corners in waste disposal and then send the
cleanup bill to its insurers?...
Third, passing tough pollution cleanup costs to insurers forces them to
continue their current practice of avoiding all pollution exposures. Ulti-
mately, it is in everyone's best interest to see the restoration of a viable in-
surance market for the traditional "sudden and accidental" pollution risk.
Id. at 40, 95; see also Williams, supra note 121, at 36 ("A Rand Corporation study
reveals that between 1986 and 1989 insurers spent $1.3 billion on Superfund. Of this
$1 billion went to defending themselves against their policyholders or defending their
policyholders against the EPA.").
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rashly began selling policies covering environmental disasters'4
during the beginning of the wave of environmentalism in the early
1980s. Later, when policyholders tried to collect on their policies,
they often found that their coverage was limited.
145
Some of the huge cleanup costs are probably due to poor con-
trol or oversight.146 When the EPA takes an enforcement ap-
proach by cleaning up the site and later seeking costs from PRPs,
it hires contractors to perform the investigative and remedial
work. Often, the same contractor will be hired to perform both
types of work, thereby creating a conflict of interest. 47 Contrac-
tors have a great incentive to unnecessarily inflate the projected
cleanup costs if it seems likely that they will be performing the job
themselves. In addition, it is important that the EPA closely mon-
144 See Robert W. Teets et al., Applying the Risk Management Process to Environ-
mental Management, 41 RISK MGArr. 18 (1994) (describing various types of environ-
mental insurance policies available).
145 See Environmental Pollution: Insurance Issues, Ins. Info. Inst. Rpt. (Ins. Info.
Inst.) (Nov. 1994). The Superfund law created insurance issues that had never been
contemplated when the policies that are now being called upon to pay for clean up
costs were drafted and priced, and when the underwriters considered the risks in-
volved in insuring the owners of these sites. These issues are being played out in the
courts. Id.; see also Paul V. Majkowski, Note, Triggering the Liability Insurer's Duty
to Defend in Environmental Proceedings: Does Potentially Responsible Party Notifica-
tion Constitute a "Suit"?, 67 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 383, 388 (1993) ("PRPs have looked to
their... insurers for performance of the duty to defend .... [Slome insurers have
refused to provide PRPs with representation.").
146 See Superfund, Issues That Need to be Addressed Before the Program's Next
Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of
the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1991)
(statement of Peter F. Guerrero, Assoc. Director Envtl. Protection Issues, Resources,
Community, and Economic Dev. Div.).
Superfund's contract management controls and oversight need to be im-
proved .... Most ... contractors work under cost-reimbursable contracts
that promise to pay all of a contractor's allowable cost and provide little in-
centive for contractors to control their costs ....
... [S]ince most Superfund contractors are reimbursed for their costs,
EPA should carefully review contractors' spending plans before approving
them, check bills for reasonableness before paying them, and verify charges
later by auditing contractor records. Our reports ... showed that EPA has
not adequately used these controls. Its regional office staffs have approved
contractor budgets without making their own estimates of what project costs
should be and paid bills without adequate scrutiny ... [S]ix of EPA's con-
tractors we selected for study had been paid over $1 billion in fiscal years
1983 through 1990, but most of this amount had not been audited.
Id.
147 See Williams, supra note 121, at 33 (noting that contractor hired to develop
remediation plan for polluted harbor was later awarded $19.4 million contract con-
nected with cleanup).
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itor expenses to prevent frivolous expenditures and the padding of
expense accounts by newly hired contractors. 14  Other conflicts of
interest arise when the same contractor performs work for both
the government and private parties at the same site. 149
Costs could also be minimized if the EPA more often allowed
settling PRPs to conduct the remediation, since a PRP who per-
forms the remedial work has a personal stake in overseeing con-
tractors to control costs.' 50 Other efficiency factors also favor al-
lowing PRPs to conduct cleanups. For instance, a PRP is often
more familiar with the site, the characteristics of the contami-
nants, the nature of past and present operations at the site, and
the physical characteristics of the land.
It can be very beneficial to have small contributors cash out
early through de minimis settlements.' 5 ' Transaction costs are
substantially reduced, and the smaller parties are protected from
being dragged into costly battles with the larger parties. The EPA
is presently working on restructuring its internal procedures in an
effort to utilize de minimis settlements more efficiently. 52
148 See Williams, supra note 121, at 33-34 ("EPA investigators found that 23 com-
panies hired for hazardous waste cleanup in 1988 and 1989 spent 28 percent of their
$265 million budget on wasteful administrative costs."). In one particular case, an
inquiry by the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations revealed that a
contractor had billed $4100 for basketball, baseball, and football tickets; $167,900 for
employee picnics and parties; $15,000 for an office party which served thousands of
dollars worth of chocolates stamped with the company logo; $63,000 for advertising;
$10,000 for a catered cruise; and $100 for a Christmas party dance instructor. Id. The
company president claimed, "No matter what differences of opinion exist on the man-
ner in which we allocate costs, [my company's] charges to the government are fair to
the taxpayer." Id.
149 See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND CONTRACTS:
EPA's PROCEDURES FOR PREVENTING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST NEED STRENGTHENING
(1989) (assessing EPA's overall system for preventing conflicts of interest).
150 See In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 904-06 (5th Cir. 1993) (deter-
mining that EPA's choice of alternate water supply was "arbitrary and capricious").
151 Stephen C. Jones, Early Settlements Finally May Catch On (pts. 1 & 2), NAT'L.
L.J., Nov. 15, 1993, at 22, NAT'L. L.J., Nov. 22, 1993, at 18. A new type of settlor, "de
micromis," is being introduced into the EPA's procedures. Id. The contamination level
cut-off for de micromis eligibility is lower than for de minimis eligibility. Id. These
smallest of small contributors can cash out their liability without paying a premium,
unlike de mininis settlors who normally must pay a premium from 50% to 100% of
their contribution cost. Id.
152 Id.; see also Superfund, Techniques to Reduce Legal Expenses Have Not Been
Used Often: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Superfund, Recycling, and Solid Waste
Management of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 14 (1993) (statement of Keith 0. Fultz, Director of Planning and Reporting Re-
sources, Community, and Economic Dev. Div.). As of September 1993, the EPA had
entered into de minimis settlements at only 73 of 1074 nonfederal Superfund sites.
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3. Why Should the Strict, Joint, and Several Liability
Structure Be Retained?
To a large extent, litigation between PRPs reflects the novelty
of the Superfund statute. As legal issues have been resolved in
the courts, PRPs have become better able to predict the conse-
quences of their actions. 153 Parties now realize that if they fail to
get involved early, other parties who do will have a distinct advan-
tage, including the right to seek contribution from them. At least
two courts have imposed Rule 11'51 sanctions against litigants
who brought contribution claims against settling parties.15 5 As
litigants understand more clearly how the statute's liability and
contribution provisions apply,1 56 litigation costs should decrease.
When parties enter into out-of-court settlements with the govern-
ment, it is possible to avoid litigation costs altogether. As time
progresses, therefore, one can expect to see more money spent on
site cleanups rather than lawsuits. It is suggested that a change
Id. at 4. Most of the de minimis settlements that did take place occurred only after
cleanup costs had been formally estimated and major parties had resolved their liabil-
ity. Id. at 6. When de minimis settlements do not occur early in the process, most of
their potential for reducing transaction costs is lost. Id. The overriding reason for the
lack of proper use of de mlnimis settlements seems to be poor management by the
EPA in promoting their use. Id. Fultz observes that the EPA has responded to this
inefficiency: "In the past year, as controversy over Superfund transaction costs has
grown, EPA has given greater emphasis to the use of the statutory settlement tools.
The most significant achievement from this effort so far has been an increase in the
use of de minimis settlements. .. ." Id. at 7. The EPA has taken steps such as provid-
ing regions with resources, training, and guidance for de minimis settlements, and
starting innovative regional pilot programs. Id. at 9. It remains unclear, however,
how the EPA intends to fund greater use of de minimis settlements over the long
term. Id. at 10.
153 De Saillan, supra note 122, at 43 ("[I]n recent years, the majority of Superfund
cleanups have been financed through out-of-court settlements or administrative or-
ders that were complied with voluntarily.").
154 FED R. Cm. P. 11.
155 See Avnet, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 1132, 1142 (D.R.I. 1992);
United States v. Alexander, 771 F. Supp. 830, 841 (S.D. Tex. 1991), vacated, 981 F.2d
250 (5th Cir. 1993). These cases clearly indicate that unnecessary litigation under
CERCLA will not be tolerated. They are illustrative of the view that settling parties
are insulated from contribution claims. Furthermore, they put an end to further liti-
gation on the issue, thereby helping to prevent transaction costs from rising
needlessly.
156 But see Stephen C. Jones, Courts Skeptical on Superfund Liability (pts. 1 & 2),
NATI'L. L.J., Feb. 7, 1994, at 18; NATL. L.J., Feb. 14, 1994, at 20 (discussing three
recent circuit court decisions which reject joint and several liability approach: United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993); Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc. v. Sequa
Corp., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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in the structure of the current law would vitiate the experience
gained in the last twelve years and initiate a whole new round of
litigation.
CONCLUSION
As CERCLA comes due for reauthorization, the goals and pro-
gress of SARA will be re-examined. Although by some measure-
ments it appears that the 1986 amendments have been ineffective,
looking further it is clear that some progress has been made. The
contribution and settlement provisions, which Congress enacted
to effectuate more efficient cleanups by voluntary parties, have
been frequently litigated. Judicial interpretation has resulted in a
majority rule holding that settlors who come forth early will be
protected from contribution claims. The courts have extended the
contribution protection provided in CERCLA section 113 to cost
recovery claims arising under section 107. It is also clear that po-
tentially responsible parties may shift only their financial respon-
sibility, not their statutory liability, through contractual agree-
ments. It is submitted that the basic structure of the statute need
not be changed. Nevertheless, it is suggested that a clause should
be added to ratify judicial interpretation of section 113(f)(2). The
revised subsection should read, "A person who has resolved its lia-
bility to the United States... in a... settlement shall not be
liable for claims for contribution or for recovery of costs regarding
matters addressed in the settlement." This addition would help
clarify congressional intent concerning the contribution and set-
tlement provisions of CERCLA. Although the language of the
statute needs only minor adjustments, the statute's enforcement
program requires more drastic change. If the problem areas of the
program are identified and improved, CERCLA's positive use as a
tool to improve hazardous waste conditions will become more
apparent.
Karen L. DeMeo
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